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Abstract—With this paper, we aim to put an issue on the
agenda of AI ethics that in our view is overlooked in the current
discourse. The current discussions are dominated by topics such
as trustworthiness and bias, whereas the issue we like to focus
on is counter to the debate on trustworthiness. We fear that the
overuse of currently dominant AI systems that are driven by
short-term objectives and optimized for avoiding error leads to
a society that loses its diversity and flexibility needed for true
progress. We couch our concerns in the discourse around the
term anti-fragility and show with some examples what threats
current methods used for decision making pose for society.
Index Terms—AI ethics, prediction, anti-fragility, variability
I. ANTI-FRAGILITY AND AI
The term anti-fragility is used by Nassim Taleb to describe
things that gain from disorder [1]. More precisely, fragility
is related to how a system suffers from the variability of its
environment beyond a certain preset threshold, while anti-
fragility is the opposite of this, namely it refers to when
systems benefit from this variability [2].
Crucially, anti-fragility is not the same as robustness. A
robust object or system is left relatively unaffected by any
extreme variability of its environment (in the sense that it will
tend to recover its initial state). By contrast, an anti-fragile
one will be affected by the same variability, but positively.
In machine learning, the robustness of a system refers to
its ability to cope with independent test sets and errors in
training data. Our argument, familiar to readers of Taleb’s
work, is that decisions that are based on statistical predictions
that maximize utility (or equivalently, reduce some kind of
error or loss) are predictably subject to a specific type of
failure, connected to anti-fragility. Our contention is, roughly,
that when a certain type (more in particular, an optimizing
kind) of decision becomes too widespread, and prevails across
domains, it makes society lose its anti-fragility. And this is a
really bad thing.
The problem we are concerned with is also one of scale:
it would emerge if most organizations are run following
the recommendations and decisions stemming from statistical
models that learn from past data. The problem would be
aggravated if some regulatory authorities were also run on the
basis of a similar logic. The risk is that one misses out on the
diversity and variability of forms of organization that appear
less efficient, at least on paper. Consider Taleb’s concept of
a ”Black Swan”: a low probability event with a high impact
[3]. Unplanned diversity plays a key role in the recovery after
a Black Swan. It often leads the discovery of new, entirely
unexpected, opportunities. Here we focus on Black Swans
that generate unexpected social benefits and we draw attention
to the risk for society to lose its potential to gain from low
probability events with a high impact. This will happen if the
commercially dominant type of AI - decision systems, that
make predictions on the basis of models trained on available
data - becomes too widespread, minimizing short-time loss
at the expense of the benefits more chaotic, error-prone, and
inefficient working of human systems.
We fear that, in spite of the considerable attention devoted
to the ethics of AI over the last few years, this problem is
currently off the maps of the debate on AI ethics.
II. THE SOCIAL GOOD OF ANTI-FRAGILITY
Taleb’s concern with anti-fragility has an interesting pedi-
gree in (at least) Western political philosophy. It is deeply
related to a vision of human affairs that the economist and
historian of ideas Thomas Sowell has labelled the ”constrained
vision” [4], [5]. Thinkers like Adam Smith, Edmund Burke,
and Friedrich Hayek all share the same view of humans as
fundamentally constrained in both their moral and intellectual
capacities. They are highly skeptical of theoretical knowledge
and value the implicit knowledge, embodied in traditions,
which reflects the inarticulate experiences of the many, filtered
by history. They have provided the intellectual arguments for
institutions that achieve the best results when many people,
even most people, do the morally wrong or intellectually
uninformed thing, and when there is no decent theory to guide
them.
One example of this is the restaurants market, where most
shops that open are likely to be soon out of business. And
yet most individuals have (irrational) faith that they will be
successful. As Taleb (2012) [1] points out ”[n]atural and
nature like systems want some overconfidence on the part
of individual economic agents, i.e. [...] the underestimation
of the risk of failure in their businesses, provided that their
failures does not impact others [...]” (p.75). Another example
is evolution through natural selection, which relies on random
mutations, which more often than not end up being harmful
for the individual affected, while enabling adaptation to the
widest range of natural environments.
Biological life and the restaurant market do not merely
tolerate imprudence. They are anti-fragile: they thrive from
individual mistakes and random variation. While the likelihood
for an individual restaurant to go out of business is high (which
implies wasted resources), the restaurant market improves
steadily, retaining its plasticity and generating novelties. Mis-
takes harm individuals but benefit society, by revealing oppor-
tunities that are otherwise ignored. Such nature-like systems
are inefficient in the short term, but utilitarian in the long term,
since the whole benefits from what harms some, sometimes
most, individuals. Compared to systems based on predictions
that favor the likely-to-be-successful, they enable flexibility by
promoting the odd one out. The restaurant market is robust:
it may adapt to a change in available ingredients, culinary
preferences, and the depth of clients’ pockets. It is also anti-
fragile: it is able to gain from such shock, generating new,
tasteful, exciting types of foods.
III. ANTI-FRAGILITY AND AI: SOME EXAMPLES
We shall now present some hypothetical cases in which
the use of statistical-prediction based decision rules may intu-
itively reduce the anti-fragility of (A) the life of an individual,
(B) science (C) the economy.
A) How to fail to stumble upon the love of your life: You
regularly commute to work, walking your way from the train
station to your office. There are several possible routes you
may take. You open Google Maps and choose the shortest
route, and you are stuck to that path every day. Nothing
interesting ever happens as you quickly walk between work
and your train. You are single. Though you tried several dating
websites and apps, you still have not found the life companion
you were looking for. If you had only decided to stop allowing
Google Maps to tell you what to do, if you had started to take
longer, more random paths, exploring the surroundings, you
might have noticed, one day, a music school, and decided to
take guitar lessons. Besides learning what is now your favorite
hobby, you would eventually have met your future wife at the
local guitar shop.
B) The non-discovery of penicillin: You are Alexander
Fleming, a Scottish researcher, in a hypothetical alternative
past in which you decide on your daily experiment by fol-
lowing the recommendations of a data-driven system. As
you return from your summer holiday, you do not realize
that something strange has happened to the bacterial cultures
stacked on a bench in the corner of your laboratory. You
are too eager to read what awaits you on your data-driven
research recommendation system. In your urge to improve
your academic CV, you only pursue the research question
predicted to generate the paper most likely to be published
in a high-impact journal. The model which you rely on uses a
similarity metric, based on past publications, and has proven
reliable in the past. So you ask your Ph.D. student to tidy up
and you do not waste a single moment of your precious time
looking at what has happened on the bench.
C) How Steve Jobs failed to get his first Silicon Valley job:
You are the manager of Atari in an alternative past in which
algorithmic job-aptitude scoring have been invented before the
PC and the I-Phone. You have just interviewed a young man
called Steve Jobs. You are impressed by his enthusiasm and
vision in the field of video-games, but you are a rational,
data-driven person who does not act based on gut feelings.
The software you use (trained on the personality traits of past
high-achievers), ranks him as the employee with the lowest
potential you have ever interviewed. So you say no to Steve
Jobs. Not seeing a future in the software industry, the young
Steve Jobs moves permanently to India, where he becomes the
most popular spiritual guru of the Eighties after Osho.
All examples provided describe different versions of the
same phenomenon. In these dystopian alternate universes, we
experience a loss of social utility (in case A, individual utility)
deriving from anti-fragile systems. They all describe the same
pattern, where the maximization of some narrowly defined
utility function with the help of statistical generalizations from
the past, enhances short-term efficiency for the individual at
the expense of the capacity, for the individual (in some cases)
and the whole of society, to benefit from unknown unknowns.
Our point here is not that AI will necessarily drive us into
such future: this is not an argument against AI technology
as such. Instead, there are approaches to machine learning
which are more favorable to exploration and less to immediate
exploitation of the results. The risk does not lie in the
technology, but in the incentive system generated by short-
sighted market forces combined with an excessive ethical
focus on harm prevention. Ultimately, the question here is
ethical and societal. The good of anti-fragility has to do with
the forgone potential gains from accepting what seems socially
undesirable, namely a less predictable future and a higher risk
of failure. When the focus is on robustness, but anti-fragility
gets forgotten, the focus becomes preventing mistakes due to
overfitted models. Calls for AI to be more robust are often
reductively interpreted as calls to reduce the error rate (due
to overfitting), when moving from training to independent
test data. Our focus here is more holistic and long-term. We
are suggesting that some error with regards to short-term
objectives is the price we have to pay to achieve long term
anti-fragility in society, and with this paper, we hope to put it
on the agenda of AI ethics.
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